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The Closing Circle: A review of Barry Commoner's book
by Robert L. Scott
"The need for institutional progress is always the same: injustice or deprivation of one
sort or another .... The conservation of the biosphere, elimination of poverty,
racism, and war .... The intelligent participation of all men as citizens of a world
republic. . . . In all the class-divided societies of the past, and in the still imperfect
approximations to the ideal of the classless society that are to be found in the best of
existing socialist, democratic republics, revolution is always brewing, and there is
room for progress to be made."2
"We are suffering from a disordered and lawless form of humanism... I refer to the
conviction,. ., that man, lord and master of nature, exists on one side, and, on the
other side there is nature, entirely exterior to him. That makes nature no more than
a thing, an object, an instrument.... In order to make their world intelligible, the
so-called primitives construct myths. They try to arrange the various elements
offered by the world of sense experience into a story. . . they try to fit these
elements together in a relationship that makes a meaningful whole .... Perhaps it
has never been more necessary than now, to say what the myths say: that a well-
ordered humanism does not begin with itself, but puts things back in their place.
It puts the world before life, life before man, and the respect of others before love
of self.' 2
Commoner's book provides an opportunity to review the problems of pollution
and their causes in the social, political, and economic fabric of our society. This review
also provides an opportunity to compare and contrast natural and social laws. From
this examination of the problem of pollution and the interface between natural and
social law emerge certain ideological concerns confronting Americans as a people.
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During the summer, this reviewer had occasion to read complaints prepared by the
lawyers in the Environmental Division of the Ohio Attorney General's Office and to
read actual judgments which came down pursuant to those complaints. Gradually a
reality took shape-a reality which is only partly reflected in the court cases, the
statutes, and the ecological text such as the one to be reviewed here. The problem
of pollution involves real people and their conflicting value demands. The value de-
mands of conservationists compete with corporate demands. The former demands an
end of harm to human, plant, and animal life. The latter agrees in principle with this
demand but seeks to protect profits, jobs, and the availability of products for public
consumption. Whether one chooses to align with the conservationists or capitalists, in
one way or another natural resources are involved, either as sources for production or as
objects for consumption upon which man depends for life and sustenance. This is nothing
new; the immediate consequence of living is the consumption of resources. What is new
is the recognition that the current level of consumption may now have irrevocable effect
upon the environment. These consequences derive from the particular manner in which
resources are used: people lay claim to certain resources and then trade them off for
money or other resources; the object is at the very least sustenance and at the most the
accumulation of wealth in order to gain greater affluence or influence in the affairs of
men. The consequence of this pattern of consumption is the focal point of Commoner's
book.
Commoner's book reveals a basic conflict in the operations between natural and human
processes. On the one hand, nature consists of a system of interconnected life forms, each
depending on and in turn being controlled by, another form. Human civilization, on the
other hand, involves a sequence of cyclically interdependent processes that feed upon
nature and that have a built-in tendency to grow without check. The latter tendency
lacks nature's internal control. This uncontrolled growth is evident in the capitalist
production system and is upsetting the balance of nature. (By nature is meant the
elements of air, water, and soil which support human and plant life.)
How Nature's Balance is Upset: Breaking Out of the Circle
Commoner tells us that the actual chemical composition of living things is an
enormously narrow selection from the range of possibilities. Organic compounds were
derived from the simple ingredients of the earth's early atmosphere by non-living,
linear chemical processes and later gave rise to life in the presence of the sun. Living
things first survived by deriving their energy from organic food via the process of
fermentation. Then, when the first green plant used sunlight to combine carbon dioxide
and inorganic materials into fresh organic matter, the circle of life was closed. This
crucial event reconverted the first life forms' waste, carbon dioxide, into its food
organic compounds. Thus, this life became a system of interconnections called an eco-
sphere, in which each affect is also a cause: an animal's waste became food for soil
bacteria; what the bacteria excrete nourishes plants; and animals eat the plant. Man has
broken out of this circle of life. The problem is how to close it, which is the source for
the title of Commoner's book. In it, he describes the breakout and its causes and offers
some suggestions for a solution.
Soil, water, and air are the bases for sustaining natural life. An understanding of the
environmental cycles that govern the behavior of these three great global systems is deemed
by Commoner a prerequisite for understanding how the cycles are broken.
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The water cycle is explained by showing the relationship between the movement of
nitrogen within the system. This movement is cyclical through a sequence of steps: fish
produce organic waste; micro-organisms working upon the waste release nitrogen from
organic forms and combine it with oxygen to form nitrate, which is reconverted to
organic forms by algae; the algae's organic matter nourishes small aquatic animals, and
these, in turn, are eaten by the fish. The balance between the rate of decay of organic
materials and the rate of algae growth determines the concentration of nitrogen in the
water. Since little nitrate reaches the water from the soil because of its thrifty use in
the soil cycle, the nitrate content of natural surface water is very low (on the order of
one part per million), and the algae population is correspondingly low. There is a
natural balance.
The air cycle is explained by describing the effect of weather. The weather keeps the
air clean. Anything that becomes airborn is caught by the weather and eventually brought
to earth, where it enters the environmental cycles that operate in the water and the soil.
If there is little air movement, whatever is introduced to the air by local activities, such
as smog, tends to accumulate in the air.
The soil cycle is, like the water cycle, explained by tracing the movement of nitrogen.
Nitrogen can enter the soil through nitrogen fixation, a process carried out by various
bacteria and algae, some of them living free in the soil and others associated with the
roots of legume plants. Nitrogen also enters the soil from the decay of plant matter and
animal wastes. Soil micro-organisms convert nitrogen into nitrate, which is taken up by
the roots of the plants.
Interruptions to these various cycles are caused by man. Pollutants in the water cycle
come from sources such as contaminated water used in industrial processes, nitrogen
(used in fertilizer) run-off from farms, and normal sanitation refuse from towns and
cities. Pollution in the air is usually thrown off by car exhaust and smoke stacks from
the varieties of industries. Soil pollution may occur from the intrusion of foreign
chemical substances, such as pesticides or mercury. The effect of these pollutants is
the gradual breakdown of the balance which normally exists among these three
environmental cycles.
Social and Economic Causes
The break in the life-sustaining cycles is caused by certain social processes that, un-
like nature, have a built-in tendency to grow. These processes are science, technology,
and economics. The growth in scientific knowledge, the knowledge of how nature
operates, is applied by technologists to achieve economic ends. Therefore, science and
technology guide the economic system and are, in turn, guided by it. There is, then, a
self-accelerating interaction between increased wealth and increased technology which
has had the effect of increasing existing pollution levels and causing unprecedented
threats to the balance of nature.
In Commoner's view, most postwar technological developments and the population
explosion have contributed substantially to this imbalance. In brief, man has been re-
placing goods which are largely degradable with those which do not deteriorate and,
therefore, accumulate as waste; he has also tended to create more goods that are dif-
ficult or impossible to recycle. Since 1946, synthetic fibers have replaced cotton and
wool; aluminum, plastic, and concrete have captured markets once held by steel and
lumber; detergents have taken over from soap; and nitrogen fertilizers have replaced
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natural manure. Furthermore, the production of synthetics and other products, such as
aluminum, requires huge inputs of energy. New technology, such as air conditioning, adds
further to energy demand. The resulting rapid rise in the production of energy adds to
the pollution from smokestacks and sewage. Moreover, pollution from this production
spiral is further exacerbated by the postwar population explosion.
All of this places new and, in Commoner's view, intolerable pressures on the environ-
ment. Nature cannot decompose most synthetic products, tolerate vast quantities of
nitrogen fertilizers, and absorb the pollutants poured into the air and water.
Science, technology, and our economic system are self perpetuating on a linear
plane. This linear development, in contrast with nature's cycle of life, converts its
endless cycles into man-made linear events. For Commoner, the problem of pollution
is a social problem which consists of resolving the competing interests of man and the
environment.
Economic Causes and Remedies
The fact that both science and technology are directed by the economic system causes
Commoner to make some suggestions for changes in that system. He suggests that techno-
logy needs to be employed to redesign the means of production consistent with environ-
mental concerns; that natural products be substituted for synthetic production; that the
resulting industrial dislocation of people because of loss of jobs should be planned for
and dealt with as any other social problem. Moreover, Commoner calls for a change in the
nature of our economic system; he calls for the rational use of production capacity ac-
cording to criteria determined by social thrift rather than private gain, and the utilization
of all countries, including developed and undeveloped, as a resource for finished products,
such as tires and clothes, and as a source for labor to relieve the detrimental effects of
capital equipment.
Implicit within these changes is a fundamental alteration in the current distribution of
wealth. Appreciation of this change can best be understood in the context of an explana-
tion of capitalist economics. The world of reality does not come in obvious categories;
men select aspects of the world to form classes or categories consistent with their own
purposes. Similarly, our economic system does not inhere in a system of fundamentally
universal principles but is designed to support a clearly discernible function.
The principle function of our economic system is to establish a criterion for using
resources and services to buttress or expand existing sets of social relations, principal
among them being the existing distribution of income. That criterion is defined by the
concept of efficiency: allocation is optimal if no re-allocation could make some members
of society richer without making others poorer. Ideally, the allocation of goods is deter-
mined by a system of norms defining resources as having value and being capable of
being transferred in the fashion of a commodity. The market price that any commodity
brings allows for the voluntary exchange of goods and services. Thus, no one is made
poorer by the exchange (or re-allocation). The system breaks down when, because of
certain factors, things of value which are necessary to our common needs do not come
into market transactions. For example, this occurs when the price of electricity fails
to reflect the cost of pollution to water caused by burning the coal necessary to pro-
duce it. The seller of electricity uses up the clean water we all need without bearing the
cost of our discomfort or death from the lack of clean water. The failure of the market
to reflect the cost of damage to the environment is referred to as an externality which
must be remedied.
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Government has responded by instituting laws to stimulate changes in production con-
sistent with the integrity of the environment, by instituting laws to cause the seller to in-
clude the cost of using the water, and by instituting laws simply to prevent such use from
arising beyond a certain critical level. Thus, the government has given subsidies to sellers
of electricity to encourage them to change their equipment to minimize pollution to water;
has charged them for the pollution they do give off into the water; has set water standards,
either general quality or particular-element content which must not be exceeded; has in
some cases prohibited any further pollution of the water; has given a property right in the
water to the general public, allowing citizens to sue the electricity seller for any substantial
degradation to the water; or has required that where the seller of electricity must obtain
a government license to do business, he must calculate the damage to the water as a basis
upon which the licensing authority can calculate whether the benefit of available elec-
tricity exceeds the cost to the integrity of the water. Similar government action has
occurred where the resource involved was air or soil. Each of these methods is more or
less effective to the purpose it is instituted.4 None, however, involves a fundamental
change in our economic structure.
None of the methods instituted by government to protect the integrity of public
goods aims at a permanent and involuntary change in the means of production. Only
on very rare occasions have existing forms of regulations forced producers to go out
of business. In those instances the price of products, in reflecting the cost of ameliorating
damage to public resources, is too high to be afforded by buyers, or the cessation of the
ability to pollute has rendered continuance practically impossible-all of which is per-
fectly consistent with the economic criteria of efficiency and of maintaining the current
capital distribution for the bulk of our economy's producers. However, Commoner's
proposal to redesign the entire system of production consistent with ecological needs
would cause severe dislocations in jobs, materials, and plants. Commoner's proposal
calls for a fundamental change from private control of production to social control:
The most serious effect of an environmental recovery program on the economic
system would be generated by the rather simple requirement for the rational social
use of productive capacity. This is best illustrated by the role of power production,
which is an essential requirement for almost every economic activity. On ecological
grounds it is obvious that we cannot afford unrestrained growth of power produc-
tion. Its use must be closely governed by over-all social needs rather than by the
private interests of the producers or users of power. This means that the allocation
of power to a given productive activity, in turn, would need to be governed by a
judgment of the expected social values to be derived per unit of power consumption
invested in that particular product. Applied, let us say, to two automobile factories,
this principle would favor the manufacturer who produced the more durable vehicle-
since that would enhance the social value (such as potential miles of use) achieved per
unit of power expended in the manufacturing process. This same principle would favor
the production of returnable bottles over nonreturnable ones, of a sparsely packaged
product over one heavily encased in plastic, of natural products over synthetic ones.
The general outcome would be a strong tendency to govern production according
to the rational-use value of the final product rather than by the value added in the
course of production, i.e., by productivity. In other words, the ecological impera-
tive calls for the governance of productive processes by social thrift-a criterion
which is likely to conflict with private gain. Thus, once it is recognized-
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under the force of the environmental crisis-that no productive system can operate
without either fitting into the ecosystem or destroying it, and that the ecosystem is
necessarily a social rather than a private good, then the logic of governing produc-
tion by social criteria rather than by private ones becomes equally evident.
It is pertinent here to recall that in economic terms environmental "externalities"
are, unlike private economic transactions, a burden on society as a whole. In effect,
then, we now know that modern technology which is privately owned cannot long
survive if it destroys the social good on which it depends-the ecosphere. Hence an
economic system which is fundamentally based on private transactions rather than
social ones is no longer appropriate and is increasingly ineffective in managing this
vital social good. The system is therefore in need of change.5
The implication of employing a rational use value to govern production ultimately
means a change in the fundamental criteria governing our economy, from efficiency to
social need. The effect would likely mean a diminution in the number of luxury goods,
a concentration on staples, decrease in the need for advertising, a lowering of the total
number of goods made, and a consequent change in the economic structure from a
growth economy to a more stabilized non-growth economy. Neither the scope of this
review nor the competence of the writer permits an extensive review of the desirability
of such a change. However, in summary, I cannot resist the opportunity to comment:
A growth economy has an appeal to our cultural psychology. It represents a kind of
freedom which permits people to control their destinies by providing a variety of goods
and services from which to choose. Moreover, because of the emphasis on choice, a
growth economy permits individual control while minimizing central control. Such
individual choice is thought to best serve the base values of dignity, equality, freedom
and health. Central control or government action is called for when for one reason or
another these base values are not being realized by all. For example, the regulatory and
welfare laws applied during the post-depression era are a case in point. While the causes
of the Depression were so complex as to continue to defy full explanation to this day,
the event which is commonly identified with the beginning of the Depression is the
stock market crash of 1929. However, the economic system as typified by the 1929
crash is not a thing separate and apart from man. The pell-mell rush to sell stock in
'29 may be attributed to human causes. Stock purchases are made primarily to make
money and are sold for profit. Selling in '29 was no different. People sold their stock
to make money, and still others sold to keep from losing it. Fear of losing also pre-
vented buying. The decline in production, loss of jobs, etc., which followed were due
to the scale of selling and revealed the inherent weaknesses within the system-thus,
the need for governmental control over what had previously been a private domain.
The application of Commoner's principle of rational use value would once again
challenge the prevailing psychology that individual freedom in the marketplace is the
best means of securing the base values alluded to above. The extent to which this new
assault will affect the prevailing tendency of individualism must yield to later deter-
mination. However, the trend away from individual control toward a "socialized"
economy, in the sense of maximizing the base values of freedom, dignity, equality,
and health, is clear. And, implementation of Commoner's plan would follow that
trend.
lnevitably, the result of an application of the rational use value concept would be a
reallocation of wealth. The wealth of the producers now defined in terms of the current
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system of production would be worthless for their intended purpose and would have to be
scrapped for recycling into new systems which technology has not had time to design. This
devaluation in capital goods also devalues money, which is the means for valuating these
goods. These are the kinds of dislocations which cause depressions and necessitate public
welfare programs (or see people die for lack of money to buy necessities), an eventuality
which completes the cycle of wealth redistribution since the only ones who can afford to
pay the taxes which support these programs are the rich people with money. Therefore,
Commoner's suggestion to change the system of production is not likely to be viewed
with favor by producers or those who fear the loss of their jobs-which includes most
working adults. Each applauds the end but suggests a go-slow policy to minimize such
dislocations until technological advances can redesign capital goods, and corporations
have had time to depreciate their losses. Time, therefore, is the difference between
making the changes Commoner suggests and protecting the current distribution of
resources-of money and the power for which it stands. How much time remains at the
current rate of deceleration in pollution levels before our environment is beyond repair
is a question Commoner does not answer.
The Interface Between the Laws of Nature and of Man
Both the general economic laws of this society and the social laws as applied in the
individual cases of pollution violation reveal a fundamental breach in our understanding
of nature.
On the one hand, Commoner's concern for the effects of pollution on nature and
ultimately upon man explicitly indicates a conflict between the laws of nature and the
economic laws of man. The former are based upon the total interaction of an entire
system which includes man. The latter is based upon a goal-directed philosophy which
purports to be modeled upon nature itself.
By applying Darwin's theory of evolution to economic affairs, Western man intended
to justify economic competition as being in fundamental harmony with nature. Instead,
such rampant competition has indirectly caused an imbalance within nature.
As man has learned to apply his understanding of nature for practical purposes, he
has substituted a goal-directed evolutionary process for the slower, integrated evolution-
ary process of nature through natural selection. In so doing, man has used Darwin's ex-
planation of competition to take precedence over the more fundamental explanation
of nature as being balanced and interdependent. Evolution proceeds from the total
interaction rather than from individual competition per se.
On the other hand, much of the failure in enforcing antipollution laws may be
attributed to a lack of knowledge of nature's complex ecosystems. For example, water,
air, and soil standards are based upon our knowledge of how nature operates and a cal-
culus of when its balance is destroyed by pollutants. Lawmakers and enforcement
officers purport to decide in the individual case whether continuing pollution at a
certain level will unreasonably risk permanent degradation to the environment. The
reality is that man makes his decisions in the area of pollution without total knowledge
of all effects upon himself and his environment. He relies instead upon "reasonable"
choices as between public safety and economic health. And, reasonable choice seems
to be based upon man's ability to know, in the individual case, whether continued pol-
lution will risk a permanent imbalance in nature. Yet, the point at which a permanent im-
balance is reached is not known. In the meantime, man is guided by the presence of "clear
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and present" harm, the effects of which must be palpably shown to cause death or in-
jury. As much has been said on the matter by one of the primary supporters of current
regulation methods, the Chase Manhattan Bank:
".' to make large-scale, rapid substitutions . . would be exceedingly costly . . .
The political consequences would be unacceptable short of clear and present
danger which has not been demonstrated." 6
Thus, the interface between natural and social laws reveals a critical gap in man's
understanding of nature and its complexities.
New Cultural Synthesis
What finally emerges from Commonergs book is a new cultural synthesis patterned upon
nature. Commoner distills from his knowledge of ecology four laws which explain how na-
ture operates:
1. Everything is connected to everything else. For example, any substance that is not
metabolized, such as pesticides or mercury, enters the food chain and becomes in-
creasingly concentrated as it moves toward the top.
2. Everything must go somewhere. Nothing goes away. Instead, it is transferred from
place to place, converted from one molecular form to another, and acting on the
life processes of any organism in which it is lodged.
3. Nature knows best. The artificial introduction of an organic compound that does
occur in nature is very likely to be harmful when man synthesizes an organic sub-
stance with a molecular structure that departs significantly from the types occurr-
ing in nature. The probability is that no degradable enzyme exists and that the
material will accumulate.
4. There are no free lunches. The introduction of nitrogen into the soil to increase
agricultural yields may have its side effects. For example, Commoner points to
the experience in Decatur, Illinois, where nitrogen was used to increase crop
yield. Nitrate run-off got into the water system with the result that there was
evidence that infant mortality was increased.
These four ecological laws offer some suggestions for solutions:
1. Since everything is connected to everything else, particular attention should be
directed at knowing the impact of industrial process on the various interconnected
cycles of nature.
2. Particular attention must be directed toward charting the path of various pollu-
tants let loose upon nature.
3. Man should be very wary of developing new compounds which do not appear in
nature and for which he does not immediately develop a degradable enzyme to
prevent its accumulation.
4. Care must always be taken to calculate the consequences of increasing any of
nature's natural processes.
The teachings of Commoner's laws of ecology is acceptance of the balance and inter-
dependence of nature. Such acceptance accounts for his advocation of social thrift as a
guide to economic institutions. The consequence of this application to the economy is
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to cause men to organize their affairs consistent with nature: the profit motive would no
longer sustain the manufacture of durable goods with a built-in obsolescence; goods which
may be easily decomposed by nature would be substituted for synthetic fibers. The re-
sult of this change in the economic system would also mean a distribution of resources
from the more developed nations to the underdeveloped nations:
Moreover, harmony with the ecosystem may often be enhanced by the use of
new processes which, while taking advantage of the best available scientific know-
ledge and technological skills, are relatively labor-intensive rather than demanding
intensive use of capital equipment and power. Here the developing nations, with
their large and growing labor supply, will have a special advantage and, given
effective economic and social organization, could enjoy an opportunity to meet
their urgent need for generating productive employment. 7
Like the ecosphere, peoples of the world would be interconnected, each supplying
its own expertise and resources.
These changes in the workings of the economy also involve fundamental reconsidera-
tions of its theoretical underpinnings, Darwinian theories of evolution. Economics,
thought to be appropriately governed by the evolutionary concept of "survival of the
fittest," was assumed to follow a predestined course of fixed stages through which
development must proceed. However, economics conditioned on theories of evolution
caused the negation of the conditions of man's existence; the interdependence of
societies and members within it were not considered. A new economic theory must be
modeled upon such interdependence.
Thus, the consequence of an alteration of the theoretical underpinnings of the eco-
nomy also involves fundamental changes within and among societies as a whole. As
societies are built upon group identity, perception of the consequence of a capitalist
society and of the distinctive share of each element in producing it should ultimately
cause a change in its identity and ultimately in its structure. Such a perception creates
a common interest. Such common interest manifests itself as a concern on the part of
each member to the joint action and in the contribution of each of its members to it.
In this instance, knowledge of what the economy is doing to nature and ultimately to
mankind who must live through nature can be an instrument for altering the associated
behavior of each individual member of society.
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FOOTNOTES
1. B. Commoner, The Closing Circle (New York: Knopf Press, 1971).
2. Mortimer J. Adler, The Common Sense of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971),
p. 200-201.
3. From a conversation with Claude Levi-Strauss appearing in Psychology Today, Vol. 5, No. 12,
pp. 39, 80 (May, 1972).
4. A general survey of the relative effectiveness of government laws
Methods Effectiveness
a. Subsidy Does not favor best abatement process; product does not bear
cost and therefore interferes with natural market tendencies;
erodes tax base.
b. Charges Limitation of jurisdiction and scale of treatment, low efficiency
because unable to take advantage of economics of scale; more
efficient than subsidy; effluent tax more efficient than uni-















Rarely effective except where clear and present threat to health.
Enforcement standards are hard to set; case-by-case approach
raises problems of due process in application; problems of proof.
Allows pre-set standards.
Problems of standing and proof; due process issue where case-by-
case approach.
Delaying tactic; conflict with legislative power
Requirement of impact statement before federal agency action in-
forms and molds public opinion; problems of distribution of infor-
mation; problem with scope of review where procedures not com-
plied with; courts have reviewed on procedural due process grounds
individual standing to sue as private attorney's general where re-
quired; institution of cost benefit analysis adds rational basis for
decisions.
Aims at minimum uniform enforcement; state enforcement.
Trend: Toward centralized, uniform regulation; increase in scope of standing, thus widening the
intervention of ordinary citizens in decision-making, allowing the expectations and values of
more people to be considered. But, it's a slow process.
5. Ibid., supra at note 1, pp. 286-87.
6. Business in Brief, No. 102, February, 1972. Chase Manhattan Bank. New York.
7. Ibid., supra Note 1 at 270.
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